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Tillich and King on Love and Justice 





n his 1964 Nobel Prize acceptance speech, Martin 
Luther King, Jr. affirms the future of humanity 
despite the unceasing threats of violence and despair. 
In defending human dignity and the prospects for 
peace and justice, King advocates for the develop-
ment of “a method which rejects revenge, aggres-
sion, and retaliation. The foundation of such a 
method is love.”1 In and through his sustained call 
for love and its import for justice despite the es-
trangement of the human condition, King appropri-
ates the theological content and method of Paul Til-
lich. This paper seeks to engage King and Tillich in 
a critical conversation regarding the relationship be-
tween love and justice, particularly as this relation-
ship pertains to transformation and restorative jus-
tice. The purpose of the paper is to argue that the 
construals of love and justice in King and Tillich 
disabuse reductive understandings of justice and re-
conceptualize justice as restorative, not retributive, 
in its presuppositions and implementations.  
A brief analysis of the system and the rationales 




significance of restorative justice and the contribu-
tions of Tillich and King. The United States domi-
nates truly as the penitentiary “superpower” with its 
approximately 2.3 million imprisoned, a number that 
eclipses China by half a million prisoners and that is 
tantamount to nearly a quarter of all the prisoners in 
the world.2 The annual budget for constructing and 
maintaining prisons has increased in the last two 
decades to over forty billion dollars.3 The massive 
rise of incarceration, what Marc Mauer has called 
the race to incarcerate,4 has implicated significant 
portions of minorities—particularly in disadvantaged 
urban centers. Whereas about 0.7% of white men are 
imprisoned, an estimated 4.8% of African-American 
men and 1.9% of Latino men were in prison or jail.5 
More than 11% of black males age 25 to 34 are in-
carcerated.6 Moreover, the overall number of women 
imprisoned is growing exponentially: between mid-
year 2005 and 2006, the female prison population 
increased by 4.8% to reach 111, 403.7  
Description of these figures invites critical inter-
rogation of the underlying reasons behind the drive 
to punish. Among multifarious questions, King’s 
aforementioned question is paramount: Can one 
punish without revenge and vengeance? In The Hu-
man Condition, Hannah Arendt sheds insight into 
the question by construing vengeance as that which 
“acts in the form of reacting against an original tres-
passing, whereby far from putting an end to the con-
I 
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sequences of the first misdeed, everybody remains 
bound to the process, permitting the chain reaction 
contained in every action to take its unhindered 
course…[vengeance] encloses both doer and sufferer 
in the relentless automatism of the action process, 
which by itself need never come to an end.”8 I argue 
that each of the four dominant rationales for pun-
ishment—deterrence, retribution, incapacitation, and 
rehabilitation—fail to transform the endless impasse 
of “relentless automatism;” models of restorative 
justice, by contrast, break through the vicious cycle.  
Deterrence is informed by teleological pursuits, 
that is, attention to the consequences and to an em-
phasis on goods. Supporters hold that deterrence 
works because the good of not being incarcerated 
outweighs any good that could be achieved in and 
through criminal activity. In An Introduction to The 
Principles of Morals and Legislation,9 Jeremy Ben-
tham construes deterrence as a mechanism for adju-
dicating utility or the balance of goods/pleasures 
over harms/pains, which, in turn, helps to establish 
social order in terms of good consequences, notably 
the greatest good for the greatest number. However, 
in addition to studies that problematize claims about 
the success of deterrence, utilitarianism’s privileging 
the good potentially ratifies transgressing individual 
dignity. Moreover, as G.W.F. Hegel observes about 
deterrence, “To justify punishment in this way is like 
raising one’s stick at a dog; it means treating a hu-
man being like a dog instead of respecting his honor 
and freedom.”10 
If deterrence theories are “forward-looking,” re-
tributive theories are “backward looking” in that 
they focus on punishing past crime. Affirming that 
punishment is deserved and is therefore just, as long 
as it is proportionate to the offense committed, retri-
bution focuses on deontological restraints, or con-
siderations of the rules, boundaries, and harms. In 
The Metaphysical Elements of Justice, Immanuel 
Kant writes: “The penal law is a categorical impera-
tive, and woe betide anyone who winds his way 
through the labyrinth of the theory of happiness in 
search of some possible advantage to be gained by 
releasing the criminal from his punishment or from 
any part of it.”11 However, retribution alone cannot 
account for individual differences within sentencing; 
obviates the challenges of achieving uniform pun-
ishment; and, similar to deterrence, neglects the 
post-conviction goals of restoring relationships (not 
just repaying a debt). Kant’s pursuit of a formal jus-
tice lapses into a protracted legalism that fails to ap-
preciate the vicissitudes of the human condition. 
Another rationale for punishment is incapacita-
tion, which removes persons guilty of violent crimes 
from society and thereby ensures the safety of the 
wider public. Sentencing policies such as the 1984 
Federal Sentencing Act and the 1987 implementa-
tion of the Federal Sentencing Guidelines have ef-
fectuated a paradigm shift to mandatory sentencing 
and determinate sentencing. The rationale of public 
safety for incapacitation becomes attenuated when it 
is recognized that it warehouses prisoners, many of 
whom are non-violent, repeat drug addicts whose 
lifetime prison sentences can be equivalent to death 
sentences. Mark Lewis Taylor extends the critique 
further and argues that such measures amount to a 
theatrics of terror, or modes of control carried out by 
“Gulag America”12 or a Pax Americana whereby 
peace is coerced and the “citizenry comes under the 
control of state-sanctioned prisons.”13 He abrogates 
incarceration for its deleterious effects: “[T]he terror 
is greater than the error. The bitter gall and resent-
ment circulate and maim within, especially for those 
whose nonviolent crimes are being met with forced 
spirit death.”14 
The rise of incapacitation precipitated the de-
cline, if not the disappearance of rehabilitation as a 
viable strategy for criminal justice. While there are 
historically theological roots of rehabilitation (e.g., 
the Quakers’ influence on the earliest penitentiaries 
in the United States), nevertheless some thinkers 
hold that the system that funded rehabilitation, nota-
bly the practice of indeterminate sentencing, became 
too subjective and resulted in miscarriages of justice. 
Others argue that rehabilitation could be coercive 
and a mechanism of social control. Michel Fou-
cault’s Discipline and Punish: The Birth of Prison 
construes rehabilitation as part of the machinery that 
disciplines and creates docile bodies. Foucault ar-
gues that the repetitive character of disciplinary pun-
ishment brings about a corrective effect that “in-
volved only incidentally expiation and repentance”15 
and that inevitably “hierarchizes, homogenizes, ex-
cludes. In short, it normalizes.”16 
Restorative justice17 provides a more holistic 
model of criminal justice because it promotes the 
dignity and relationality of all persons; it perceives 
conflict as destructive of relationships; it commits to 
a process in which victims and other stakeholders 
can contribute to the criminal justice deliberations; it 
contemplates punitive alternatives to incarceration; 
and it upholds dialogue as the means for healing and 
restoration. Redressing deterrence theories’ lack of 
respect for human freedom, retributive theories’ 
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failure to appreciate the victim and the wider com-
munity, incapacitation theories’ emphasis on separa-
tion, and rehabilitation theories’ exclusive focus on 
individual, not communal, transformation, restora-
tive justice theories conceptualize justice and pun-
ishment in communal and relational terms. In devel-
oping their ideas about the relationship between love 
and justice, Tillich and King support the procedures 
and values of restorative justice. 
Both Tillich and King envisage the relationship 
between love and justice as the grounds for engaging 
and transforming conflict and inequality. Conceptu-
alizing love as reunion of the separated and justice 
as laws and principles of a universal character, Til-
lich argues that justice and love require one another, 
where “it is love which creates participation in the 
concrete situation.”18 Participation in the concrete 
situation resonates with restorative justice’s claim 
about dialogue in and through conferencing between 
offenders, victims, family members, and members of 
the community. Tillich insists that such participation 
“preserves the individual”19 because it works through 
the center, “which is not calculable,”20 or not reduci-
ble to precise, punitive formulas of justice. Such re-
ductions deny justice because “one cannot transform 
a living being into a complete mechanism”21 and 
“[j]ustice is always violated if men are dealt with as 
if they were things.”22 Tillich censures “the bour-
geois principle” (The Socialist Decision) and “tech-
nical reason” (Systematic Theology) as reductive and 
instrumentalizing forces which, according to Lang-
don Gilkey, constitute “the main, if not the unquali-
fied, antagonist[s] of most of Tillich’s thought.”23 
Resisting these forces requires the courage to be that 
denies hegemony to social control and controlling 
knowledge so that “knowledge is more than a fulfill-
ing; it also transforms and heals.”24 
In reflecting on God’s “creative justice” and de-
nominating it as the form of “reuniting love,”25 Til-
lich provides further grounds for restorative justice 
by challenging retributive notions that justice must 
accord with strict proportionality. Rather, God “can 
creatively change the proportion, and does it in order 
to fulfill those who according to proportional justice 
would be excluded from fulfillment.”26 Creative jus-
tice, rooted in claims about divine love and mercy, 
entails speaking to and listening to the other, despite 
hostility and separation, and underlies morality as 
the constitution of person as person in the encounter 
with another person. Creative justice confronts es-
trangement and therefore creates the intersubjective 
conditions for the possibility of transforming indi-
viduals and restoring relations. Tillich identifies the 
three functions of creative justice as listening, giv-
ing, and forgiving.27 In contrast to the privileging of 
social utility (e.g., plea-bargaining) or rigid strictures 
(e.g., three strikes’ laws), restorative justice theories 
invite listening (or authentic dialogue), giving (or 
awareness of and consent to mutual demands placed 
on the self by another), and forgiveness (or, analo-
gous to the covenant28, actions that do not replace 
justice but rather restore just relations). Forgiving 
love extends the requirements of justice for the pur-
poses of restoration. The ultimate criterion of crea-
tive justice is universal fulfillment symbolized as the 
kingdom of God.29 
What about justice and power? Power dimen-
sions, in Tillich’s judgment, can partially justify 
Hegel’s retributive claim that the criminal has a right 
to punishment;30 hence, Tillich insists that the ful-
fillment of justice is a precondition for reuniting 
love.31 It could be plausibly argued that Tillich 
would join contemporary thinkers such as Donald 
Shriver who embrace restorative justice without 
completely eliminating retributive justice.32 Never-
theless, retributivists such as Kant are overly ab-
stract33 and fail to provide a robust account of jus-
tice; Tillich affirms that love as grace—the accep-
tance of the unacceptable—undergirds justice. Til-
lich argues that Anselm’s theory of atonement, often 
identified as a retributivist theory of punishment34, 
contradicts the ontological insight that “ultimately 
love must satisfy justice in order to be real love, and 
that justice must be elevated into unity with love.”35 
Tillich’s integrating love and justice—and its mani-
festation in restorative justice—does not violate 
Bonhoeffer’s cheap grace because “there is grace in 
every reunion of being with being, insofar as it is 
reunion and not the misuse of the one by the other, 
insofar as justice is not violated.”36 
King’s appropriation of—and prophetic en-
gagement with—basic themes in Tillich’s thought is 
illustrated in King’s consistent discussion finite 
freedom,37 sin as separation,38 powerless morality,39 
and ontological courage.40 King similarly speaks of 
the power of love to engender transformation. In his 
Christmas Eve Sermon on Peace (December 24, 
1967), King writes—amidst the demonic elements of 
segregation, discrimination, and violence—that love 
must undergird justice. Appropriating the austere 
demands of agapaic love mandated by imitatio 
Christi, King insists that actions of violence will be 
met with actions of love. Reversing in profound 
ways the logic of justice as reciprocity, King argues 
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that love—as suffering and the logic of superabun-
dance that characterizes the gift—effectuates change 
of self and other and achieves justice. In addressing 
the violent, hooded perpetrators of the night, King 
anticipates a double transformation: “We will not 
only win freedom for ourselves; we will so appeal to 
your heart and conscience that we will win you in 
the process, and our victory will be a double vic-
tory.”41 Agapaic love, or “understanding, creative, 
redemptive good will for all men,”42 expresses a 
“willingness to go to any length to restore commu-
nity.”43 Nonviolent resistance, the refusal to be du-
plicitous in a system of revenge and violence, func-
tions as a “means to awaken a sense of moral shame 
in the opponent. The end is redemption and recon-
ciliation. The aftermath of nonviolence is the crea-
tion of the beloved community, while the aftermath 
of violence is tragic bitterness.”44 Restorative justice 
confronts the “tragic bitterness” of violence and the 
concomitant retaliation carried out by intensely puni-
tive measures and offers counter-models such as re-
integrative shaming45 for the purposes of reconcilia-
tion. 
Similar to Tillich, King insists that mechanisms 
and social structures cannot eradicate human dignity 
and freedom: “But man is not a thing. He must be 
dealt with, not as an ‘animated tool,’ but as a person 
sacred in himself.”46 The sacred dignity of all per-
sons perforce requires that the whole concept of jus-
tice be re-conceptualized as the restoration of indi-
vidual and communal wholeness. As restorative jus-
tice proponent Christopher Marshall notes, “If cor-
rective justice is understood in essentially retributive 
terms, then acts of mercy and forgiveness will be 
seen as, at best, a foregoing of the legitimate claims 
of justice or, at worst, a distinct injustice. But if jus-
tice is understood in more relational and restorative 
terms—making things rights and repairing relation-
ships—then justice is actually consummated in for-
giveness and reconciliation.”47 Rethinking justice as 
forgiveness and reconciliation, according to King, 
acknowledges the interconnectedness of all persons, 
uplifts individual dignity of both the offender and 
the victim, and “exalts the personality of the segre-
gator as well as the segregated.”48 
In addition to gainsaying the diminishment and 
subjugation of persons by systems, King and Tillich 
repudiate the broader social indifference to such 
treatment. This indifference presents the most daunt-
ing obstacle to restorative justice in particular and 
social justice in general. King’s famously indicts the 
white moderate, who is “more devoted to ‘order’ 
than to justice; who prefers a negative peace which 
is the absence of tension to a positive peace which is 
the presence of justice”49 and whose “[l]ukewarm 
acceptance is much more bewildering than outright 
rejection”50 because it exacerbates social responses 
to violence and abjures the need for community. Mi-
roslav Volf similarly observes that indifference can 
be more deadly than hate, in part, because “the cold 
indifference can be sustained over time.”51 Reflect-
ing on the Truth and Reconciliation efforts in South 
Africa, John de Gruchy notes that the majority of 
white South Africans—who benefited politically, 
economically, and socially from the system of apart-
heid—failed to support the restorative justice efforts 
of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission be-
cause they experienced indignity, innocence, and 
shame.52 This inability to grasp self-reflexively the 
dialectics between victims, offenders, and the com-
munity fails to restore justice. Tillich analyzes indif-
ference in solipsistic terms, including pathological 
anxiety (whereby an individual clings to “the castle 
of self-defense”53 or hides in the “security of a 
prison”54) and the failure to adopt a prophetic atti-
tude. In contrast to the cultivation of indifference, 
the refusal to accept guilt, the flawed understandings 
of justice, and the insulated perspective vis-à-vis the 
needs of the other, love facilitates restorative justice 
because “[i]t breaks the prison of any absolute moral 
law, even when vested with the authority of a sacred 
tradition”55  
For both Tillich and King, love functions as the 
mechanism that underpins, challenges, and ulti-
mately transcends the struggle for justice. Love pro-
vides the ontological basis for harnessing power dy-
namics in constructive ways that promote just com-
munity. They therefore advocate for restorative jus-
tice on normative and not simply procedural 
grounds.56 One principal difference between King 
and Tillich pertains to their views on violence and 
coercion. Though they both advocate for resistance 
to injustice and dehumanizing forces, King’s non-
violent resistance differs from Tillich’s conception 
of the ineluctable character of coercion. However, 
these differences are not incompatible, but rather 
signal different means for restorative justice.  
Tillich’s constructive triangulation of power, 
love, and justice in and through an ontological 
framework is well known, but his subtle analysis of 
the ineluctable tensions between them provides an-
other significant contribution to restorative justice 
debates. Echoing the insight of Augustine that we 
must judge given human wretchedness,57 Tillich rec-
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ognizes the inevitable necessity of coercion: “We 
have to apply force; otherwise we would sacrifice 
that power in which love is embodied, we would 
sacrifice that justice which is in the principle of form 
of all social life.”58 This coercion is tragic because it 
transforms the person, the prisoner, into a thing in-
capable of exercising his or her freedom to act out of 
the totality of his or her being and thus incapable of 
forming a full community with other persons.59 Yet, 
similar to restorative justice theorists who argue that 
“punishment should serve an instrumental value in 
criminal procedures, not an a priori one,”60 Tillich 
does not accept this coercion, this violence and 
vengeance, as the definitive word in light of his 
claim about Christian ethics that “denies anybody 
the right to use these tools [of power] in such a way 
as to contravene the divine creation and the future 
potentialities of human history. Force serves power; 
but if it destroys power in serving it, it contradicts its 
own meaning.”61 Hence, Tillich breaks with the du-
alism of Augustine’s two cities and Luther’s two 
kingdoms by arguing that coercive force is neces-
sary, and yet the law of love is valid: “These are not 
two worlds, but one—the one in whose divine 
ground, power and love are united; in which power 
and love, in their coexistence, conflict in a thousand 
ways, yet whose hope is the reunion of power and 
love.”62  
On anthropological grounds, King would concur 
with Tillich that the reality of sin precludes utopian 
progress or a fully Rauschenbuschian optimism 
about human nature.63 Their concern for the deeply 
embedded character of sin and guilt helps to dis-
abuse facile assumptions about restoration, thereby 
disquieting critics regarding restorative justice’s 
overly sanguine assumptions.64 Yet, King also re-
futes the ultimate necessity of violent coercion for 
challenging unjust social structures. Similar to Gus-
tavo Gutierrez’s solidarity and Karen Lebacqz’s love 
of enemy as forgiveness and survival, King upholds 
self-reflexive awareness and non-violent, social ac-
tion as the mechanism of subverting unjust power. 
Tillich’s coercion and King’s non-violent resistance 
can be aligned in and through a commitment to the 
prophetic witness that, in opposition to purely arith-
metic or corrective theories of justice, constitutes, as 
Paul Ramsey puts it, a redemptive justice, which, 
similar to current models of restorative justice, af-
firms that “although an alien or forgotten [person], 
[one] comes to belong or still belongs to the com-
munity.”65 
In conclusion, the prospects for restorative jus-
tice appear only in embryonic form in the United 
States. The lessons from Australia, New Zealand, 
South Africa, Japan, and post-conflict situations are 
powerful ones.66 Similar to the construal of love and 
justice in King and Tillich, Miroslav Volf insists that 
prior to any moral judgment, a “will to embrace” 
“transcends the moral mapping of the social world 
into ‘good’ and ‘evil’”67 that never excludes the 
other,68 promotes a peace “guided by the recognition 
that the economy of undeserved grace has primacy 
over the economy of moral desert,”69 and creates a 
reconciled community “in which each recognizes 
and is recognized by all and in which all mutually 
give themselves to each other in love.”70 This will to 
embrace is tantamount to the portrait of agapaic love 
in King and Tillich. King and Tillich contend that 
justice is a necessary but not sufficient mode for 
criminal justice; it is only through the integration of 
love and justice that can forestall vengeance and heal 
and restore community.  
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